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DEFEASIBLE SECOND AMENDMENT
RIGHTS: CONCEPTUALIZING GUN LAWS
THAT DISPOSSESS PROHIBITED
PERSONS
JACOB D. CHARLES*
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2011, Ricky Kanter pleaded guilty to mail fraud after bilking Medicare out
of several hundred thousand dollars.1 He served his year in prison, finished his
term of supervised release, paid his criminal penalty, and reimbursed Medicare.2
But, under federal law, his felony conviction bars him from possessing firearms
for the remainder of his natural life.3 He sued, claiming that this lifelong
prohibition violates his Second Amendment right. The Seventh Circuit upheld
the blanket federal ban as applied to Kanter.4
In a dissent from that decision, Judge Amy Coney Barrett sought to clarify a
threshold question about these types of person-based firearms prohibitions and
whose rights the Second Amendment guarantees. She described two views about
the issue: “Some maintain that there are certain groups of people—for example,
violent felons—who fall entirely outside the Second Amendment’s scope. Others
maintain that all people have the right to keep and bear arms but that history and
tradition support Congress’s power to strip certain groups of that right.”5 She
argued, however, that “[t]hese approaches will typically yield the same result; one
uses history and tradition to identify the scope of the right, and the other uses
that same body of evidence to identify the scope of the legislature’s power to take
it away.”6
The debate Judge Barrett described centers on how to think about prohibited
persons’ Second Amendment rights: are such people carved out from the
Constitution’s scope altogether? Or are they covered, but (in some situations)
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1. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 2019).
2. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Kanter’s only hope for restoration is a presidential pardon.
4. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 451.
5. Id. at 451–52 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
6. Id. at 452.
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permissibly dispossessed? In other words, are prohibited persons’ Second
Amendment rights nonexistent, or just defeasible? Or, to put it another way, are
these persons’ rights void, or merely voidable?
This distinction gets at whether to think of people-based prohibitions as
coverage or protection questions. The question of coverage asks whether the
conduct or activity falls within the scope of the particular constitutional
guarantee.7 The protection inquiry typically involves analyzing the government’s
justification for regulating the “covered” conduct and how closely its action
tracks that justification.8 This two-step framework pervades constitutional law.
After all, most constitutional provisions cover conduct or activities for which they
do not always secure protection. Commercial speech, for example, is covered by
the First Amendment, but that speech is not always protected.9 As Fred Schauer
has observed, the distinction between coverage and protection “is important in
separating the question of the category of action to which the right (any right)
applies from the question of whether the right should prevail in cases of conflict
with other interests, or for that matter other rights.”10
This distinction has become embedded in Second Amendment jurisprudence.
In the methodological framework that the courts of appeals use for adjudicating
Second Amendment claims, courts undertake a two-step inquiry. As the Third
Circuit explained, “[f]irst, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden
on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it
does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form
of means-end scrutiny.”11 In other words, first look to coverage; then analyze
protection.
The conceptual debate over how to think about the Second Amendment
rights of certain classes of people revolves around these categories. Federal law
bars lots of people from having guns. Undocumented immigrants, felons, certain
mentally ill individuals, those dishonorably discharged from the military, and
others cannot possess firearms.12 Many states bar additional categories of people
from possessing firearms, including violent misdemeanants, certain juvenile
offenders, stalkers, and alcohol abusers.
Some of the prohibitions exist only so long as a person remains in a particular
status, such as restrictions for the term of a domestic violence restraining order
or for however long a person is using or addicted to controlled substances.13 But
7. Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 276 (1981).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980)
(“There can be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity.”).
10. Schauer, supra note 7, at 276.
11. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018).
13. Id. § 922(g)(3), (8); see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for
Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and A Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1497 (2009)
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some are permanent. Felons, for example, are barred for life from ever possessing
a firearm, absent affirmative state action to restore their rights.14 Should we think
about challenges to these laws as coverage questions or protection ones? Do
different classes of persons raise different conceptual issues? Answering these
questions also has implications for thinking about other person-based restrictions
on constitutional rights, like felon disenfranchisement and similar laws.
And how courts conceptualize the right could matter in many cases. For
example, if those under twenty-one years of age fall outside the scope of the
Second Amendment, they lack standing to challenge federal laws prohibiting
direct interstate handgun sales.15 If undocumented immigrants are not covered
by the Second Amendment, they lack standing to challenge a state’s assault
weapons ban, even if no law bars them from possessing other guns. Or “imagine
that a legislature disqualifies those convicted of crimes of domestic violence from
possessing a gun for a period of ten years following release from prison. After
fifteen years pass, a domestic violence misdemeanant challenges a handgun ban
identical to the one that the Court held unconstitutional in Heller.”16 If the issue
is one of coverage, the person lacks standing, despite expiration of the bar to
possessing guns. On the coverage view, “[i]f domestic violence misdemeanants
are out, they’re out.”17 These groups might still have a privilege to own guns if no
law prohibits their possession, but, on the coverage view, they have no right.
This Article analyzes the debate over these laws, discussing the theoretical
foundations for the competing views and the levers the law has to relieve
overbroad categorization. Part II describes the traditional two-part coverageprotection framework in Second Amendment litigation and questions whether
classes of people should be treated differently than classes of arms or activities.
Part III argues that people-based prohibitions should generally, although not
exclusively, be considered protection issues. It describes the theoretical and
practical reasons for assuming that the Second Amendment provides broad
coverage to many classes of people and explains how presumptions and burdens
of proof help guide the protection inquiry. Finally, Part IV explores the different
approaches circuit courts have taken when analyzing people-based prohibitions
and argues in favor of the Sixth Circuit’s approach.
In the end, though most people come within the scope of the Second
Amendment, triggering conduct or circumstances (for example, certain types of
criminal convictions or mental illness adjudications) can make individual’s rights
defeasible.
(“Some of the statuses that trigger the laws—minority, alienage, being under indictment, being a felon in
those states that allow for restoration of civil rights some years after the conviction—are temporary, and
may expire in years or even months.”).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
15. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185,
211 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding the federal ban on handgun sales to minors).
16. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J. dissenting) (citing District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008)).
17. Id.
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II
ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL COVERAGE AND PROTECTION QUESTIONS FOR
CLASSES OF PERSONS
A. The Traditional Paradigm
Heller presaged the two-part coverage-protection framework for Second
Amendment questions. It described the scope of the Second Amendment with
reference to text, history, and tradition.18 And it explained that certain activities,
arms, and perhaps people simply fall outside that scope. For example, the
majority suggested that concealed carrying falls outside the scope of the right.19
The Second Amendment still, Heller suggested, covers a lot. Yet not everything
covered is immune from regulation. “[T]he Second Amendment extends, prima
facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms,”20 but that does not mean
it grants “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”21 In other words, Heller recognized that
courts would confront questions both about the Second Amendment’s coverage
and about its protection.
The two-part test employed in the courts of appeals provides a framework for
assessing all types of Second Amendment challenges. It arose in the aftermath of
Heller as courts grappled with how the right to keep and bear arms applies to
different situations.22 In perhaps its first use in the courts of appeals, a Seventh
Circuit panel articulated the framework as follows:
[W]e read Heller as establishing the following general approach to Second Amendment
cases. First, some gun laws will be valid because they regulate conduct that falls outside
the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified. If the
government can establish this, then the analysis need go no further. If, however, a law
regulates conduct falling within the scope of the right, then the law will be valid (or not)
depending on the government’s ability to satisfy whatever level of means-end scrutiny
is held to apply . . . .23

18. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 (2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them.”).
19. See id. at 626 (noting that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions” and that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful”).
20. Id. at 582; but see id. at 623 (“Miller stands only for the proposition that the Second Amendment
right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.”).
21. Id. at 626.
22. The test arose not just because of the hints from Heller, but also because courts drew on the First
Amendment framework with which they were so familiar. See Jacob D. Charles, Constructing a
Constitutional Right: Borrowing and Second Amendment Design Choices, 99 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 13–14) (on file with author).
23. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 614 F.3d
638 (7th Cir. 2010).
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This approach rapidly took hold in other courts of appeals,24 although some
courts phrased the steps slightly differently.25 Courts have applied the framework
to all sorts of Second Amendment challenges, whether they raise questions about
the types of arms protected,26 how those arms can be carried,27 or, importantly,
about who gets to keep and bear them.28
The two-part framework follows a predictable pattern in constitutional
adjudication. As Joseph Blocher and Darrell Miller describe it: “The first
question is rule-like and concerns coverage: Is this a Second Amendment case at
all?”29 Some cases are easy at the first step—machine guns are out,30 as are pipe
bombs, “[s]ilencers, grenades, and directional mines.”31 For laws imposing these
restrictions, the government need not mount a defense of how the law advances
any important or compelling interests or defend the tailoring of its regulation to
meet that need. The conduct is simply not covered by the right at all.
“The second question is standard-like and concerns protection: When and
how are these restrictions on Second Amendment rights justified?”32 The
question here is what interest the government has in regulating the conduct and
whether its solution is sufficiently tied to that interest. Courts at this stage
typically calibrate the level of scrutiny depending on two factors: (1) how closely
the law infringes on core constitutional conduct, and (2) how substantially it
burdens that conduct. For example, in assessing a ban on certain semi-automatic
weapons and high-capacity magazines, the First Circuit noted that after
“[a]ssuming (favorably to the plaintiffs) that the Act implicates the core of the
Second Amendment right,” it next had to “train the lens of [its] inquiry on how
heavily [the ban] burdens that right.”33 Some judges, in dissent, have questioned

24. E.g., United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x 392, 393 (4th Cir. 2010), vacated on reh’g, 628 F.3d
673 (4th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with Skoien that means-end scrutiny is necessary).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (“As we read Heller, it
suggests a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges. First, we ask whether the
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of
means-end scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
26. E.g., Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 2019) (reviewing regulation of assault weapons
and high-capacity magazines); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(same).
27. E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing a good cause
requirement for public carry license).
28. E.g., Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 623 (4th Cir. 2017) (reviewing regulation on possession
by felons).
29. JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS,
REGULATION AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 110 (2018).
30. See Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hatever the individual
right to keep and bear arms might entail, it does not authorize an unlicensed individual to possess
unregistered machine guns for personal use.”).
31. United States v. McCartney, 357 F. App’x 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009).
32. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 29, at 110.
33. Worman v. Healey, 922 F.3d 26, 36 (1st Cir. 2019) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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this second focus on how substantially the right is burdened,34 but for the most
part courts have looked to these factors in articulating the proper level of
scrutiny.35
These inquiries into coverage and protection are easy enough to understand
when dealing with arms or activities. The analysis they call for is no more difficult
than the analogous inquiries into whether the right to obscenity,36 or child
pornography,37 or videos of animal abuse,38 or violent video games39 are
guaranteed by the First Amendment’s notion of freedom of speech. To be sure,
as the First Amendment cases show, that analysis is difficult and often
contestable, but we have an established way for conceptualizing the inquiry. Yet
we might wonder, as the next Subpart suggests, are Second Amendment peoplebased restrictions different?
B. Are People Different?
As we saw, the traditional two-part framework applies whether the challenge
arises from a regulation of arms, activities, or people. Few question the
traditional two-step inquiry for ascertaining the scope and strength of the Second
Amendment with respect to certain arms or activities. To be sure, some judges
and academics have been critical of the way the two-part framework has been
fleshed out in the courts, because they see the tiers-of-scrutiny inquiry as the type
of balancing test Heller forbade. But they acknowledge the coverage-protection
paradigm ensconced in the enterprise of constitutional litigation; some types of
weapons are outside the scope of the Second Amendment (coverage issues) and
some types of conduct within the scope of the right can be regulated (protection
issues).
But Judge Barrett’s dissent questions whether it makes any sense to employ
this framework when talking about people. In a coverage paradigm, “[a]rms and
activities would always be in or out.”40 “But a person could be in one day and out
the next: the moment he was convicted of a violent crime or suffered the onset of
mental illness, his rights would be stripped as a self-executing consequence of his
new status.”41 She calls it “analytically awkward” and inconsistent with Heller to
speak, for example, of felons and mentally ill individuals as without rights at all
34. E.g., Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Attorney Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106, 128 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Bibas, J., dissenting) (“How much the law impairs the core or how many people use the core right that
way does not affect the tier of scrutiny.”).
35. See, e.g., Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]o determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny, the court must consider (1) how closely the law comes to the core of the
Second Amendment right; and (2) how severely, if at all, the law burdens that right. Intermediate scrutiny
is appropriate if the regulation at issue does not implicate the core Second Amendment right or does not
place a substantial burden on that right.” (citation omitted)).
36. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
37. See generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
38. See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
39. See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
40. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
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instead of simply possessing defeasible rights.42 On her view, “a person convicted
of a qualifying crime does not automatically lose his right to keep and bear arms
but instead becomes eligible to lose it.”43
One could think this makes an important point but perhaps overstates the
distinction between arms, activities, and people. Heller, after all, instructed courts
to ask a coverage question about arms that suggests they would not “always be in
or out”: are the regulated weapons in “common use” by law-abiding citizens for
lawful purposes?44 If so, they fall within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee. Because this rule tethers the Constitution’s scope to consumer choice
among legally available options, it allows at least the possibility that some arms
that would have been “out” several decades ago may be “in” now. The reverse
could also be true. If revolvers fall out of common use could they lose
constitutional protection? Or might they become, à la Barrett, “eligible to lose”
that protection?45
In addition, there are other constitutional limitations on otherwise protected
conduct that kick in automatically without any state action. Citizens have the
right to run for and assume political office. But a twenty-nine year-old cannot
become a United States Senator. A thirty-four year-old cannot ascend to the
presidency. An individual who serves two terms as president cannot be elected
to a third. These restrictions don’t in and of themselves seem analytically
awkward.46
Heller also appears to have limited the scope of the right to certain people—
not just to citizens, but to law-abiding (and, perhaps separately) responsible ones.
As Justice Stevens noted in dissent:
[T]he Court itself reads the Second Amendment to protect a “subset” significantly
narrower than the class of persons protected by the First and Fourth Amendments;
when it finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the
Court limits the protected class to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”47

And in McDonald, Justice Scalia himself emphasized that some of those
“traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right.”48
But there’s surely something correct in Judge Barrett’s diagnosis. We can
more clearly assess that concern in considering how courts and commentators
treat three different classes of persons prohibited from possessing firearms under
federal law: (1) undocumented immigrants, (2) felons, and (3) mentally ill
individuals.

42. Id. at 453.
43. Id.
44. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008); see also Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136
S. Ct. 1027, 1032 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he pertinent Second Amendment
inquiry is whether stun guns are commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes today.”).
45. Kanter, 919 F.3d at 453 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
46. I’m grateful to Darrell Miller for these examples.
47. Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 802 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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1. Undocumented Immigrants
First, consider how courts construe the Second Amendment rights of
undocumented immigrants. Three federal courts of appeals have held that
undocumented immigrants are outside the scope of the Second Amendment.49
The Fifth Circuit put it bluntly: “The Court’s language in Heller invalidates
Portillo’s attempt to extend the protections of the Second Amendment to illegal
aliens.”50 “Illegal aliens,” the panel declared, “are not ‘law-abiding, responsible
citizens’ or ‘members of the political community,’ and aliens who enter or remain
in this country illegally and without authorization are not Americans as that word
is commonly understood.”51 Thus, even if both the state and federal government
repealed all legal restrictions on firearm possession by undocumented
immigrants, these individuals would lack standing to assert Second Amendment
challenges to hypothetical handgun bans in Mississippi, Maryland, or Missouri.
They might be allowed to own some guns under this legal regime, but they would
have no right to invoke the Constitution as a safeguard against any legislative
encroachments.
But not all courts or commentators think that this question can be settled as
a matter of coverage. The Seventh Circuit, for instance, has held that any resident
immigrant who has substantial connections with the United States comes within
the scope of the Second Amendment: “In the post-Heller world, where it is now
clear that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is no second-class
entitlement, we see no principled way to carve out the Second Amendment and
say that the unauthorized (or maybe all noncitizens) are excluded.”52 And the
Ninth Circuit recently declined to exclude such individuals at step one, preferring
to assume undocumented immigrants are covered, and moved to a protection
analysis that upheld the restriction under intermediate scrutiny.53
Scholars generally agree that—consistent with the type of intertextual
approach Heller seemed to employ—at least some non-citizens are covered.
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, for example, argues that “in comparison to other
rights associated with citizenship, the right of armed self-defense posited by
Heller cannot coexist with the restriction of ‘the people’ of the Second
Amendment to citizens.”54 He notes that despite a long history of firearm
49. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Portillo-Munoz,
643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011) as revised (June 29, 2011); United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir.
2011) (per curiam).
50. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
51. Id.
52. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2015).
53. See United States v. Torres, 911 F.3d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).
54. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to
Bear Arms, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2010); see also Justine Farris, Note, The Right of Non-Citizens
to Bear Arms: Understanding “The People” of the Second Amendment, 50 IND. L. REV. 943, 957 (2017)
(“Given the drafters’ use of the term ‘citizen’ in other constitutional provisions, use of the phrase ‘the
people rather than ‘citizen’ demonstrates the conscious and clear intention that the phrase ‘the people’
includes more than just those individuals with citizen status.”); D. McNair Nichols, Jr., Guns and
Alienage: Correcting A Dangerous Contradiction, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2089, 2097 (2016) (“This Note
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regulations, the restrictive view that excludes many non-citizens is inconsistent
with modern treatment of constitutional rights and with Heller’s own emphasis
on a personal self-defense right.55
2. Felons
Second, take challenges to the felon-in-possession ban. In United States v.
Vongxay, the Ninth Circuit rejected a felon’s challenge to the federal ban because
“felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental
right to bear arms.”56 They are, according to the court, simply not covered by the
Second Amendment at all. In rejecting an as-applied challenge, the D.C. Circuit
recently agreed: “felons are not among the law-abiding, responsible citizens
entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment.”57 As one Third Circuit
judge put it, the reason the Second Amendment does not guarantee the right to
certain people or for certain weapons “is that they fall outside the historical
‘scope of the right’—not that the right yields to some important or compelling
government interest.”58 Many other courts have followed this path, concluding
that felons—or at least certain types of felons—are excluded from the Second
Amendment’s coverage altogether.59
3. Mentally Ill Individuals
Third, consider treatment of prohibitions on possession by those with certain
mental health histories. In Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, the
Sixth Circuit confronted a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), the relevant portion
of which prohibits a “class of persons”—those with a prior involuntary
commitment—from possessing firearms.60 At the initial step, the court had to
“determine whether those people, rather than their conduct, f[e]ll completely
outside the reach of the Second Amendment.”61 It held that they did not. Because
such individuals were presumptively covered, the court had to turn to the
protection inquiry and measure the benefits of the regulation against its
infringement.

recommends that courts apply the ‘substantial connections’ test—in the same way courts currently apply
that test to interpret ‘the people’ in the Fourth Amendment—to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether a specific undocumented person qualifies as part of ‘the people’ for Second Amendment
purposes.”).
55. Gulasekaram, supra note 54, at 1524.
56. 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010).
57. Medina v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 152, 154 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
58. Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 359 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgments)
59. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848 F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 500 (2017)
(“[W]e simply hold that conviction of a felony necessarily removes one from the class of ‘law-abiding,
responsible citizens’ for the purposes of the Second Amendment, absent the narrow exceptions
mentioned below.”).
60. 837 F.3d 678, 688 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
61. Id.
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Courts and commentators have by and large treated people the same way
they have treated arms and activities. They assume that text, history, or tradition
can guide the inquiry into the scope of the right for classes of people the same
way it can for classes of arms. The next Part takes up the analytical and
conceptual concerns with this approach to coverage questions.
III
DEFEASIBILITY, BURDENS, AND TRIGGERS
A. Scope Justifications: How to Think About Who’s Covered and Who’s Not
1. Collapsing Coverage and Protection: Definitional-Absolutism
One way to protect the strength of a constitutional right is to narrow its scope.
“No right can be unlimited in coverage, but it is at least plausible to imagine a
right that is unlimited in protection (absolute) within the scope of coverage.”62
Some views of prohibited persons have this absolutist flavor to them; courts and
commentators adopting this view would constrict the scope of the right to cover
a narrow subset of citizens and then apply maximal protection to those within the
covered sphere. For example, Robert Leider argues that proceeding to the
second step of the inquiry undermines what it means to be a constitutional right
in the first place.63 In his view, the protection inquiry—in which the right exists
merely as a prima facie privilege subject to government divestment—“is
incompatible with our constitutional framework.”64 Instead, he opts for a kind of
definitional-absolutism, an approach that “combine[s] close attention to defining
the boundaries of the category with a desire to grant absolute protection within
those boundaries.”65 As Leider says, “[a] court cannot coherently pronounce the
same conduct protected by a constitutional right and subject to sanction.”66 On
this view, once people are covered, they are protected.
Similar to Leider, Judge Hardiman, in agreeing that the federal felon ban was
unconstitutional as applied to two individuals, argued that the Second
Amendment excludes dangerous persons from its scope, but absolutely protects
the existence of the right for those inside.67 As he said after finding nondangerous felons covered:
It is true that courts typically apply some form of means-end scrutiny to as-applied
challenges once it has been determined that the law in question burdens protected
conduct. But when, as in these appeals, it comes to an as-applied challenge to a
62. Schauer, supra note 7, at 276.
63. See generally Robert Leider, What Is A Constitutional Right?, U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Nov. 15,
2018), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2018/11/15/what-is-a-constitutional-right-by-professor-robertleider/ [https://perma.cc/L77Y-UP4Z].
64. Id.
65. Schauer, supra note 7, at 274.
66. Leider, supra note 63.
67. Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 362 (3d Cir. 2016) (Hardiman, J., concurring); see also
id. at 365 (“When the Second Amendment applies, its core guarantee cannot be withdrawn by the
legislature or balanced away by the courts.”).
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presumptively lawful regulation that entirely bars the challenger from exercising the
core Second Amendment right, any resort to means-end scrutiny is inappropriate . . . .
This is because such laws are categorically invalid as applied to persons entitled to
Second Amendment protection—a matter of scope.68

Many of the other judges in the case, meanwhile, concluded that answering the
scope question didn’t foreclose the separate protection inquiry: “to guarantee
absolutely the ability to keep and bear arms even in cases where disarmament
would survive heightened scrutiny would be a radical departure from our postHeller jurisprudence and risk undermining many commonplace constitutional
gun regulations.”69
Although the definitional-absolutist approach seeks to cabin judicial
discretion, it can fall victim to one of two types of dangers Schauer identified: (1)
“simplify[ing] things to such an extent that the resultant formula has little if any
analytical or predictive value,” or (2) “achiev[ing] consistency and workability at
the expense of excluding from coverage much that a full theory of [the Second
Amendment] ought to include.”70 Judge Fuentes faulted Judge Hardiman’s
approach for falling into the first trap: its rule for who gets covered lacks the
guidance necessary to avoid vagueness problems and “seems to require an
analysis so particularized as to be practically characterological, raising additional
problems of fair warning and due process.”71 In other words, it has no predictive
value.
We might see categorical exclusions of nonviolent felons as falling into the
second trap. That ban may be more efficient and workable than figuring out
who’s sufficiently dangerous or lacks sufficient virtue or doesn’t exercise enough
reason that we can exclude them from the scope of the right. But the flat ban
might also exclude from coverage those whom our full theory of the Second
Amendment would protect. After all, “[i]s the public safer now that Martha
Stewart is completely and permanently disarmed?”72 These twin dangers of the
definitional-absolutist account give some reason for keeping the coverage and
protection questions distinct.
Another reason to do so is that, in settling boundary disputes in the Second
Amendment, we lack broadly agreed-upon theories about the purpose for the
right.73 And theory drives coverage questions, at least the hard ones. If, for
example, the guiding purpose of the Second Amendment is national security—

68. Id. at 363.
69. Id. at 345 (emphasis added). They also recognized the extremity of his view. See, e.g., id. at 344
(“Some judges—including Judge Hardiman and those colleagues who join his opinion concurring in the
judgments—and commentators have interpreted Heller to mean that any law barring persons with
Second Amendment rights from possessing lawful firearms in the home even for self-defense is per se
unconstitutional.”).
70. Schauer, supra note 7, at 275.
71. Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 411 n.223 (3d Cir. 2016) (Fuentes, J., concurring).
72. C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695,
696 (2009).
73. BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 29, ch. 6.
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the “security of a free State”74—then excluding felons from coverage might make
perfect sense.75 But if the overriding purpose is personal self-defense, why should
felons or mentally ill individuals be left out? “Felons,” after all, “may need arms
for lawful self-defense just as much as the rest of us do.”76 And if anti-tyranny
concerns motivate the Second Amendment, then perhaps those who have shown
reluctance to follow government demands would be well placed to oppose an
overweening state. We thus have good reasons to reject a categorical-absolutism
that collapses the constitutional inquiry into one step.
B. Prying Them Apart: Defining In versus Defining Out
Commentators have identified as many as nine possible theories for the
Second Amendment.77 Though some of these have garnered more attention than
others, it’s fair to say there is still considerable disagreement about the purpose
of the Second Amendment. Given this lack of consensus, it makes more sense—
and requires fewer contentious assumptions—to back into person-based
questions by “defining out” groups of people whom we have no good reason to
cover rather than try to start by “defining in” who gets to be within the scope of
the right in the first place.
Choosing between these two approaches can have profound effect. For
coverage questions, defining in means constructing a theory about the purpose of
the right and including those arms, activities, and people that pass the test of
inclusion. Defining out does the opposite—it starts with an intentionally broad
view of the right and carves out some subcategories of groups. “These
subcategories too must be conceived within the framework of a theory . . . ,
although the focus here is negative (no reason to grant special protection against
the power of government) rather than positive (grant special protection here
because . . .).”78 So we start with a broad theory of what the Second Amendment
protects—say, arms-bearing for lawful purposes—and then narrow from there.
For example, we could ask: Do second graders have Second Amendment
rights?79 One commentator argues that “[c]hildren, of course, are constitutional

74. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
75. United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Denying felons the right to bear
arms is also consistent with the explicit purpose of the Second Amendment to maintain ‘the security of a
free State.’”).
76. Volokh, supra note 13, at 1499; see also Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the
Second Amendment, 108 CAL. L. REV. 63, 75 (2020) (“Ex-felons and the mentally ill maintain their selfdefense rights, but, according to the list [in Heller], lose their Second Amendment rights.”).
77. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of the
Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131 (2008).
78. Schauer, supra note 7, at 280.
79. Cf. David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Second Amendment Rights of Young Adults,
43 S. ILL. U. L.J. 495, 530 (2019) (highlighting the Continental Congress’s warning to King George III
“that the Americans’ superiority with arms, due to their training beginning in childhood, would make
them a formidable foe: ‘Men trained to Arms from their Infancy, and animated by the Love of Liberty,
will afford neither a cheap or easy Conquest’”); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (“The
constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults.”).
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persons and thus have constitutional rights.”80 Or, to put it in Judge Barrett’s
terms, Heller said the Second Amendment covers all Americans, and children are
Americans.81 Despite these intuitive appeals, we don’t have particularly good
reasons for including children within the scope of the right.82 They typically won’t
have a great need for armed self-defense; teachers, parents, and other guardians
are often legally required to ensure their welfare.83 They weren’t allowed to serve
in the early militias and are not allowed to serve in the military today, so they
won’t help advance the cause of national security. And due to their fragility,
immaturity, and youth, they won’t make great compatriots in a fight against
government tyranny. Since we have no good reason to grant children protection,
we can define them out. They can thus be considered outside the scope of the
right.
This is one way to define out from the scope of the right. Another way is to
focus more on language than on theory. The Second Amendment guarantees the
right of “the people” to keep and bear arms. As Part II showed, Heller was far
from clear on who exactly this language encompasses. The Court variously
referred to Second Amendment rights-holders as “all members of the political
community,”84 “all Americans,”85 “law-abiding, responsible citizens,”86 and “lawabiding citizens.”87 This conception is certainly narrower than one that would
include all those within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Noting
this coverage restriction, Gulasekaram argues that “[i]n altering—and thereby
contracting—the definition of ‘the people’ to political membership as a function
of constitutional interpretation, the Heller majority recalls Dred Scott’s express
limitation on constitutional reach.”88
The defining out method puts the burden on those arguing that a group
remains outside the scope of the right; it starts with a broad coverage
presumption, “and then create[s] areas of noncoverage, regarding which the
burden of proof of nonapplicability of [Second Amendment] principles can be
met.”89 It seems those who want to exclude children can meet their burden. It’s
not entirely clear whether those who want to exclude undocumented immigrants
can.
80. Katherine Hunt Federle, The Second Amendment Rights of Children, 89 IOWA L. REV. 609, 668
(2004).
81. See Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 452 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
82. The age of majority line may be blurry and its resolution might complicate the picture, but for
the sake of the scope question, we can fairly easily say those under fourteen fall outside the scope of the
right without raising more difficult questions about older teenagers.
83. Though this right is not, of course, absolute. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (holding that “a State’s failure to protect an individual against private
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause”).
84. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
85. Id. at 581.
86. Id. at 635.
87. Id. at 625.
88. Gulasekaram, supra note 54, at 1537.
89. Schauer, supra note 7, at 281.
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This discussion helps to show that even the fairly rights-protective defining
out method can establish that some classes of persons are outside the scope of
the Second Amendment. But it also reveals that we have good reasons to think
that not all classes should be treated the same. Perhaps some are categorically
carved out (for example, young children and maybe undocumented immigrants),
but others are not.
C. Rethinking Defeasibility: Personalized versus Class-Based Inquiries
As the above discussion suggests, there are good reasons, contra Judge
Barrett, to suggest that some classes of persons are excluded from the scope of
the right. Like a pair of captains of industry who try to raise a First Amendment
defense to their prosecution for a verbal price-fixing conspiracy, a toddler seeking
solace in the Second Amendment is out of luck. But Judge Barrett is right to
underscore the boundary-drawing issues around other types of prohibited-person
laws, like those concerning felons and mentally ill individuals. Lacking a fullfledged theory of the Second Amendment, we ought to proceed slowly when
settling questions about scope; defining out is preferable to defining in. And, for
that reason, prudence suggests treating most person-based prohibitions as
protection questions, not coverage ones.
We can think about these person-based prohibitions at two levels: (1) at the
“class of person” level, or (2) at the individual level. Obviously, legislation cannot
be written to prohibit John Doe from possessing guns because he assaulted that
one guy with a bottle in a bar fight. Laws are general. But suppose we think of
the question in a different way. Imagine that we repealed all prohibited person
laws and replaced them with a permit-to-purchase regime. In that world, let’s
assume, no one is barred from possessing firearms because they belong to a
certain class (for example, those convicted of qualifying offenses), but everyone
has to get a permit to purchase and possess a firearm. Anyone, except children
and (perhaps) undocumented immigrants, can seek a permit. Suppose the local
law enforcement officials charged with implementing the law are given some
discretion over whether to grant permits.
We can build up to a view about coverage and protection by considering the
types of people to whom we have considered it fair or just to deny permits. In
other words, this conceptual exercise starts with a presumption that everyone
who can apply for a permit is covered by the Second Amendment and puzzles
out the way to think about who gets defined out.
Consider several different examples. A man named Carl, claiming to be Jesus
Christ, walks into the station to get his permit. He relays his fears of the
government monitoring his every move from a bug implanted in his head. He
talks about the agents whispering in his ears as he tries to sleep. And he assures
the officers that he will only use the weapon against the government agents that
sometimes creep into his room at night. Should law enforcement issue the permit
to Carl?
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Or take Tim. He’s a member of a white nationalist organization dedicated to
promoting the message of white supremacy through whatever means necessary.
He’s been to prison for prior assaults, including beating a Hispanic man. He
complains about minorities in his neighborhood ruining the “culture” of
America. He intends to do something about them when he gets his permit. Should
Tim be issued one?
Next, consider Sheila. She shows up to the police station ten years after her
release from federal prison for a felony wire fraud conviction. She worked as an
investment banker for twenty years before engaging in a Ponzi scheme that
robbed thousands from investors. She served her two years of imprisonment, paid
all her fines and restitution, and is no longer under government supervision. Does
she get a permit?
Intuitions might differ about which, if any, of these individuals should be
denied a permit. Under current federal prohibited-person laws, Sheila is barred
from possessing firearms for life, Tim might be (depending on the nature of his
assault charge), and Carl is not, absent any other information about him. These
three characters are also paradigms for three main types of reasoning that judges
and scholars have used for person-based prohibitions: (1) reason, (2) virtue, and
(3) danger.
In Tyler, the court had to consider whether the permanent firearm bar for a
man who had previously been involuntarily committed to a mental institution
withstood constitutional scrutiny. It first noted that “[t]he government bears the
burden at step one to conclusively demonstrate that the challenged statute
burdens persons historically understood to be unprotected.”90 The court held that
the government did not meet that burden and thus remanded for the lower court
to perform the step two analysis.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Batchelder expanded on the step one inquiry,
embracing the “reason” rationale for the scope of the right. She argued that, at
the Founding,
the idea of right was intimately connected with the idea of reason, a term that referred
not only to the “faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood [and]
enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions,” but also to
the mind’s ability to distinguish “good from evil.”91

Only those who could exercise reason were imbued with rights. “The emphasis
on reason is significant, for, according to Founding-era legal definitions, an insane
person was someone who had lost his reason.”92 Because such individuals could
be confined at common law, they could also be disarmed. But, crucially, once they
regained such reason, they could exercise their rights and hence could not
continue to be disarmed. Thus, in her view, the fundamental question as to
whether § 922(g)(4) can constitutionally be applied is whether a person is

90. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 688 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
91. Id. at 704–05 (Batchelder, J., concurring in part).
92. Id. at 705.
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currently mentally ill as the Founding generation would have understood that
condition.93
In addition to the reason view, some courts and scholars point to the notion
of “virtue” as circumscribing the scope of the right. As historian Saul Cornell
argues, the right to keep and bear arms “was not something that all persons could
claim, but was limited to those members of the polity who were deemed capable
of exercising it in a virtuous manner.”94 Courts use this rubric at step one. “[M]ost
scholars of the Second Amendment,” observed the Seventh Circuit, “agree that
the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that,
accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”95 The Third
Circuit uses this type of test to determine whether or not those convicted of an
otherwise disqualifying felony can be constitutionally excluded from the scope of
the right to keep and bear arms: “being convicted of a non-serious crime does not
demonstrate a lack of ‘virtue’ that disqualifies an offender from exercising those
rights,” but conviction for a serious one does.96
Finally, another view finds “danger” to be the touchstone of the inquiry into
who is covered. As Judge Hardiman argued, “[t]he most cogent principle that can
be drawn from traditional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms is that
dangerous persons likely to use firearms for illicit purposes were not understood
to be protected by the Second Amendment.”97 Joseph Greenlee similarly argues
that “[h]istory shows that the right could be denied only to mitigate threats posed
by dangerous persons.”98 And the Third Circuit recently said, in disagreeing with
Tyler, “[w]e can therefore ascertain that the traditional justification for disarming
mentally ill individuals was that they were considered dangerous to themselves
and/or to the public at large.”99 As we saw, Judge Barrett also focused on danger,

93. See generally Fredrick E. Vars, Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633 (2014)
(arguing that those actively suffering from delusions or hallucinations, whether or not subject to §
922(g)(4), should be forbidden from possessing firearms).
94. Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” the Current Crisis in Second Amendment
Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657, 679 (2002). On this view, exercising the right to keep and bear arms
was part of civic virtue that not everyone participated in. “Women, free Africans, and resident aliens
might claim a genuinely individual right such as the right of religious conscience, but they were not
included among those who bore arms.” Saul Cornell, A New Paradigm for the Second Amendment, 22
LAW & HIST. REV. 161, 165 (2004).
95. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Medina v. Whitaker, 913
F.3d 152, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Medina v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 645 (2019) (“While we
need not accept this [virtue] theory outright, its support among courts and scholars serves as persuasive
evidence that the scope of the Second Amendment was understood to exclude more than just individually
identifiable dangerous individuals.”); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010).
96. Binderup v. Attorney Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 349 (3d Cir. 2016).
97. Id. at 357 (Hardiman, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgments).
98. Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Historical Justification for Prohibiting Dangerous Persons from
Protecting Arms, WYO. L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3509040 [https://perma.cc/S4LQ-P5PQ].
99. Beers v. Attorney Gen., 927 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2019).
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but for her this was part of the protection inquiry at step two, not a matter of
coverage.100
Analyzing these individuals on a case-by-case basis also helps to reveal where
individual rights conflict with class-based regulations. Almost by definition, a
class will be overinclusive as to its purpose or the interest it seeks to serve.101 But
courts typically analyze claims on a class-wide basis. Felons of a certain type can
be disarmed; those with certain mental health adjudications can be denied the
right. Presuming broad coverage and then cautiously defining out leaves open a
vast number of questions about how to implement this framework and vindicate
the interests in the Second Amendment’s underlying values. The next Part takes
up some tentative answers and raises more questions.
IV
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES AND SOME REMAINING QUESTIONS
This Article argues that person-based prohibitions should, by and large, be
treated as protection questions, and not coverage ones. Judge Barrett is right that
it can be conceptually confusing to speak of individuals as within or outside the
scope of the Second Amendment. But this Article parts ways with Judge Barrett
on the absoluteness of the claim. There are in fact classes of persons who possess
no Second Amendment rights regardless of whether or not the government takes
any action. Young children are the most immediate example. There may be
others such groups (for example, undocumented immigrants and individuals
suffering delusions or hallucinations), but those proposing to exclude such
individuals bear the burden of showing that such exclusion is justified by history
or theory.
Although every circuit has rejected a facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
those that have permitted as-applied challenges disagree about whether such
challenges should be resolved at the coverage or protection stage. The difference
between as-applied challenges and the (universally rejected) facial challenges to
prohibited-person laws illustrates the particularized nature of the debate. “If a
court holds a statute unconstitutional on its face, the state may not enforce it
under any circumstances, unless an appropriate court narrows its application; in
contrast, when a court holds a statute unconstitutional as applied to particular
facts, the state may enforce the statute in different circumstances.”102 This final
Part suggests that the Sixth Circuit’s as-applied framework best implements the
defining out method and that these person-based claims should often be funneled
to the protection stage.
In the Third Circuit, as-applied challenges take place through a burdenshifting framework. The first step is a threshold coverage inquiry in which the
100. Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 453 (7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting).
101. See Joseph Blocher & Jacob D. Charles, Firearms, Extreme Risk, and Legal Design: “Red Flag”
Laws and Due Process, 106 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
102. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236
(1994).
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challenger must present evidence to show that she is not part of the class of
persons historically excluded from the Constitution’s scope.103 Only if she meets
that task “does the burden . . . shift to the Government at step two to show the
regulation as applied satisfies intermediate scrutiny.”104 In some ways, the burden
on the challenger at the coverage stage requires the same type of evidence and
analysis that typically takes place at the protection stage: what justification the
government has for denying this class the right and whether that justification fits
this context.105 The Third Circuit’s approach creates more confusion by placing
the burden on the challenger at step one.106
By contrast, the Sixth Circuit’s approach to as-applied challenges for personbased prohibitions is more straightforward and analytically clear. There, as in the
two-step framework more broadly, the government bears the burden at each step
of an as-applied challenge. First, “[t]he government bears the burden at step one
to conclusively demonstrate that the challenged statute burdens persons
historically understood to be unprotected.”107 Only if the government prevails at
that step does the court move to step two and require the government to satisfy
means-end scrutiny.108
The Sixth Circuit approach coheres well with the arguments for treating most
people as covered and the burden-allocation role of the defining out method.109
The benefit of this method—where the government bears the burden—also helps
to make the outcomes of as-applied challenges more uniform. With the Third
Circuit approach, one DUI misdemeanant could fail to make the best case for
himself and lose his challenge, but another one might prevail. In the Sixth Circuit
approach, by contrast, if the government proves DUI misdemeanants are not
covered, then no others can prevail.
Funneling more challenges to the protection stage also serves the logic of asapplied challenges: as claims against rules. “The Constitution itself directs courts
to focus on the constitutionality of a challenged statute rather than on the
privileged or unprivileged character of the conduct of the litigant challenging

103. Beers, 927 F.3d at 155.
104. Folajtar v. Barr, 369 F. Supp. 3d 617, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2019).
105. See, e.g., Holloway v. Attorney Gen., 948 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding seriousness the
rationale for excluding felons and then proceeding to delineate factors to determine seriousness,
“including, but not limited to, whether the crime poses a danger or risk of harm to self or others, whether
the crime involves violence or threatened violence, the classification of the offense, the maximum
penalty, the penalty imposed, and how other jurisdictions view the crimes”).
106. The Third Circuit is not entirely alone. See, e.g., United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th
Cir. 2014) (dismissing the as-applied challenge because the challenger “ha[d] not shown that he is no
more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
107. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 688 (6th Cir. 2016).
108. Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 205–06 (6th Cir. 2018).
109. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 650–51 (7th Cir. 2010) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The
better approach is to acknowledge the limits of the scope inquiry in a more straightforward way: The
historical evidence is inconclusive at best . . . . Because Skoien is not categorically unprotected, the
government’s use of § 922(g)(9) against him must survive Second Amendment scrutiny.”).
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it.”110 For the person-based firearm prohibitors, though, § 922(g) doesn’t need to
stand or fall at once; courts can and have discerned various subrules that preserve
the “rights against rules” frame,111 while also recognizing that not all prohibited
persons are equally situated. Courts are able to discern subrules in the statute
(such as different kinds of felons, different stages of mental illness) and sever the
unconstitutional applications from the constitutional ones.112 This properly puts
the onus on the statute rather than the litigation resources of the individual. And,
in many cases, it will lead more cases to the protection stage because the
inconclusive theoretical and historical evidence for excluding certain people from
the right will mean the government fails to meet the step one burden.
Of course, a regime in which anyone can raise an as-applied challenge to a
generally applicable (and facially constitutional) law would create an
administrability headache. But if Second Amendment scope questions—at least
for people—should generally be answered at the protections stage and not the
coverage stage, then many of these questions will be unavoidable.

110. Dorf, supra note 102, at 248; see also Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral
Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998) (“Constitutional rights in our
own legal world are structured, not as shields around particular actions, but as shields against particular
rules.”).
111. See generally Adler, supra note 110.
112. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113
HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1334 (2000) (“In a nutshell, even insofar as challenges are challenges to rules, it
does not follow that all challenges call upon courts to adjudicate the validity of statutory rules in their
entirety; some challenges are to subrules; and challenges to the precise subrules applicable to particular
facts are, for all functional purposes, as-applied challenges that permit a court to sever a statute and
separate valid from invalid subrules or applications.”).

